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Financial analysts and the media often argue that the Swiss stock market reacts 
to news from the U.S., including the opening of Wall Street. On July 31, 2002, 
for example, the most widely circulated daily newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
reported that worse-than-expected economic data and a subsequent weak open-
ing of Wall Street depressed the Swiss stock market. We investigate whether 
and in what sense this dependence can actually be observed. We want to know 
whether the two markets are correlated, whether SWX traders respond to infor-
mation that is relevant to Wall Street, and whether there is any evidence that the 
SWX lags Wall Street.
More specifically, we examine how the release of U.S. macroeconomic news 
that is relevant to the American stock market (Wall Street for simplicity) affects 
stock return volatility and trading volume on the SWX. Moreover, we study how 
the correlation between the two markets evolves over time following the opening 
of Wall Street until the close of the SWX. We want to know how important this 
correlation is and whether there is any evidence that the Swiss market trails Wall 
Street. We also explore how return volatility and trading volume on the SWX 
change immediately preceding the Wall Street open and thereafter.
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Previous studies have pursued similar lines of inquiry. Some examine co-move-
ment among international equity markets, asking among other things whether 
common fundamental factors or contagion effects might cause that correlation.1 
Other studies analyze the intraday behavior of stock return volatility.2 And other 
studies yet investigate the intraday impact of macroeconomic news releases, par-
ticularly those related to the U.S. economy.3
Our investigation is similar in principle to those conducted by B, 
F, and F (1995) and E and L (1993 and 1996). 
B, F, and F, for example, examine the impact of macro-
economic news releases using transaction prices closest to the half-hour of every 
trading day for FTSE 100 and S&P 500 futures contracts from July 1, 1986 to 
December 28, 1990. They find that FTSE return volatilities jump significantly 
right after U.S. macroeconomic announcements about employment, retail sales, 
and the consumer price index. In contrast, the U.K. volatility corresponding to 
the opening of U.S. markets is no higher than what would be predicted by the 
traditional U-shaped intraday return volatility pattern. These results contradict 
the previous study by K and W (1990) that examines intraday FTSE 
spot index values from July 1 to October 13, 1987. This paper finds low volatil-
ity surrounding U.S. announcements coupled with heightened price movements 
corresponding to the opening of the U.S. stock market.
According to our results, return volatility and trading volume on the Swiss 
stock exchange more than triple at the time of release of U.S. macroeconomic 
news relevant to Wall Street, and stay higher until the end of the trading day. 
However, both return volatility and trading volume dip right before Wall Street 
opens. It appears as if Swiss traders wait to see how Wall Street opens before 
resuming their trades. Thereafter return volatility and trading volume go back 
to normal patterns. There is also evidence that stock price changes on the SWX 
are closely related to what happens on Wall Street. And results indicate that the 
SWX trails Wall Street somewhat, particularly at the time of the Wall Street 
1 That literature includes E and S (1989), H, M, and N (1990), K and 
W (1990), L, E, and I (1994), S and E (1994), O 
(1995), K and S (1996), 
2 See H (1986), A and P (1988), J and J (1988), L and 
L (1990), and C, C, and K (1991).
3 See MQ and R (1993), E and L (1993 and 1996), B, F, 
and F (1995), J, L, and L (1998), L and E (1998), C-
 and W (2003). The literature on the impact of macroeconomic announcements is 
considerable. For additional references, see, among others, D  and M (2004), 
F (2004), and P (2004).
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open. This lagged relation is too weak, however, to imply a profitable invest-
ment strategy.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section presents the hypotheses 
and the methods used to test them. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 dis-
cusses the results and Section 4 offers conclusions.
1. Hypotheses and Test Methodology
If the SWX was somehow driven by Wall Street, it would react to the same news 
and respond to what actually happens there. In particular, the Wall Street open 
would induce a prolonged increase both in volatility and trading volume on the 
SWX. Following is an explanation of these hypotheses in more detail and a dis-
cussion of how we intend to test them.
1.1 Hypotheses
We begin our investigation with an examination of the correlation between Wall 
Street and the SWX from the Wall Street open to the SWX close. Based on the 
ties between the Swiss and the U.S. economies, that correlation should be posi-
tive. What we are interested in is whether, as asserted by the financial press, 
there is also a positive lagged correlation. That should be the case particularly 
right after the Wall Street open since that event would likely release informa-
tion that Swiss traders allegedly have been waiting for. That is the first proposi-
tion we want to test.
The second proposition follows B, F, and F (1995) 
and E and L (1993 and 1996). Accordingly, the disclosure of major 
macroeconomic news in the U.S. should lead to a significant increase in stock 
return volatility on the SWX.
If the macroeconomic news disclosure is significant, it should introduce uncer-
tainty that could take time to be resolved. Thus, the third proposition we exam-
ine is whether major macroeconomic news releases in the U.S. have a prolonged 
impact on return volatility.
The fourth testable proposition is that the Wall Street open induces an increase 
in stock return volatility. Theoretical and empirical arguments buttress the pre-
diction of a volatility spike following that event. K and W (1990), 
for instance, predict that in a non-fully-revealing equilibrium there should be 
a price jump in all other markets when one particular market reopens. Con-
sistent with that, they observe that the volatility of prices in London rises just 
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after the New York opening. If there is uncertainty about the Wall Street open, 
however, return volatility should rise also right before that event. This assertion 
is based on research documenting an increase in stock return volatility around 
predictable events such as dividend (K and L, 1985) and earn-
ings announcements (P and W, 1979). We also examine whether 
the impact of the Wall Street open depends on whether it is preceded by a U.S. 
macroeconomic disclosure.4
The fifth proposition we test is based on F and R’s (1986) finding of a 
volatility increase when traders interact. Accordingly, stock return volatility on the 
SWX should rise during the time both markets are open, namely from the open-
ing of Wall Street at 3:30 p.m. to the close of the SWX at 4:30 p.m. Swiss time.
Intuitively, the very same propositions should hold also for trading volume.5 
Specifically, trading volume should increase at the time of U.S. macroeconomic 
announcements, at the time Wall Street opens, and during the time both Wall 





















where the superscript I denotes the stock index of relevance, the subscript t indi-
cates time of the day, and ItP is the value of the index at time t.
We investigate the correlation between the U.S. and the Swiss stock market 
by regressing the return on the Swiss Market Index (SMI) against the contem-
poraneous and lagged returns on the S&P 500 index. The regression takes the 
following form:
 & &0 1 2 1 ,
SMI S P S P
ij ij ij ijR R R −= β + β + β +ε i = 1,…,n; j = 1,…,12. (2)
4 For a discussion of the impact of the U.S. markets on the SWX, see also RANALDO 
(2004).
5 The literature on the correlation between trading volume and return volatility is vast. See, for 
example, G, R, and T (1992), and H and J (1993).
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The regression is estimated between 3:30 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. Swiss time for each 5-
minute interval j = 1,…,12 of joint trading across all the days i in the sample period 
(for details on data, see the next section). The variables are defined as follows:
SMI
ijR  
= the continuously compounded return on the SMI for the 5-minute 
interval j on day i;
&S P
ijR  
= the continuously compounded return on the S&P 500 for the 5-minute 




ijR −  
= the continuously compounded return on the S&P 500 for the 5-minute 
interval j − 1 on day i; and,
εij = a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed error term with zero mean 
and constant volatility.
We expect the coefficient β1 associated with the contemporaneous return on 
the S&P 500 to be positive. More importantly, if the SWX trails Wall Street, 
the coefficient β2 associated with the lagged return on the S&P 500 should be 
positive as well. The assumption, of course, is that a 5-minute interval is short 
enough to capture this relation.
1.2.2 Tests of Volatility and Trading Volume Changes
Stock return volatility is defined as the standard deviation (SD) of return during 
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where n is the number of days in the sample, and IjR  is the average return over 
the same intraday interval (computed across all days in the sample for the inter-
val in question), and, as before, I denotes the stock index of relevance.
To test our propositions concerning stock return volatility, we need a bench-
mark telling us what would happen to volatility without the events in question. 
Our standard of comparison is the intraday U-shaped pattern of volatility theo-
rized by A and P (1988) and documented in the U.S. for both 
stock returns6 and average volume of shares traded7. According to A and 
6 W, MI, and O (1985), H (1986), L and L (1990), C, 
C, and K (1991).
7 J and J (1988).
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P, U-shaped trading- and price-volatility patterns arise endogenously 
as a result of the strategic behavior of liquidity traders and informed traders. For 
example, if many discretionary liquidity traders realize their liquidity demands 
after the market closes, they will want to satisfy them as soon as the market opens 
the next day. Similarly, the interval within which many discretionary liquidity 
traders must trade terminates at the close of a trading day. There will therefore 
be a tendency for trading to be concentrated at the close, too. Given the presence 
of discretionary liquidity traders at the open and the close, informed traders will 
tend to gravitate towards those trading times as well, particularly if their signals 
are correlated. Competition among informed traders (given correlated signals) 
will improve the terms of trade of liquidity traders and reinforce their tendency 
to trade at the open and the close of trading.
For a comparison with the patterns reported in the literature, Figure 1 plots 
the intraday return volatility on the SMI for the period ranging from January 6 
– September 30, 1997. As one can see, the intraday U-shaped volatility pattern 
observed in the U.S. also exists in Switzerland. Note the clear spike at 2:30 p.m. 
commensurate with the release of U.S. macroeconomic news. The Swiss Perfor-
mance Index (SPI), the alternative index for the Swiss stock market studied here, 
follows a similar pattern.
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= γ +γ × +γ × +γ ×
+γ × +γ × +γ × +ε  (4)
where
 t = time elapsed from the first intraday return on the index in question;
I
macroD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the first 10 minutes following the 
macroeconomic news release, and equal to 0 otherwise;
I
totD  = a binary variable equal to 1 from the time of the macroeconomic news 
release to the SWX close, and equal to 0 otherwise;
I
WSopenD = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10 minutes preceding the Wall 
Street open, and equal to 0 otherwise;
I
overlapD  = a binary variable equal to 1 from the Wall Street open to the SWX 
close, and equal to 0 otherwise; and,
 εt = a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed error term with zero mean 
and constant volatility.
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The first two arguments in the regression equation involve time and describe 
a U-shaped intraday volatility pattern. As we just discussed, all the other vari-
ables, except for the disturbance term, are binary variables that define a given 
time interval. We use this regression equation to test our remaining proposi-
tions, namely:
a. ImacroD  measures possible volatility changes during the 10 minutes immedi-
ately following major U.S. macro announcements. As explained below, all 
the announcements we examine are made at 2:30 p.m. Swiss time (8:30 a.m. 
Eastern Standard Time).8 Based on what we said, this variable should have a 
positive coefficient;
b. ItotD  captures possible volatility increases from the time of major U.S. macro 
news releases to the close of trading on the SWX. This variable should have a 
positive coefficient;
8 In fact, 9 minutes in the case of the SPI and 10 minutes in that of the SMI.
Figure 1: Intraday SMI-return Volatility
The graph plots the average standard deviation of returns on the SMI during various 5-minute 
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c. IWSopenD  captures volatility changes during the 10 minutes leading up to the 
Wall Street open. The coefficient of this variable should be positive; and,
d. IoverlapD  measures the effect of joint trading from the Wall Street opening to the 
SWX close. As argued above, the coefficient of this variable should be positive 
as well.
We estimate Equation (4) separately for days with and without major U.S. macro 
announcements. For the latter days, we should observe the following:
a. In the absence of major macroeconomic announcements, the variable 
I
macroD  should have a coefficient of zero;
b. By the same argument, the variable ItotD  should also have a coefficient of 
zero;
c. The coefficient associated with IWSopenD  should be positive, since the Wall Street 
open is presumably associated with uncertainty regardless whether it is pre-
ceded by a macroeconomic announcement or not; and,
d. The coefficient of the variable that identifies the time of joint trading, IoverlapD , 
should also be positive. The rationale is the same as that offered for days with 
macro disclosures.
In estimating Equation (4), we also examine a specification with an additional 
dummy variable that identifies the first 10 minutes immediately following the 
Wall Street open. As it turns out, this specification does not change our main 
conclusions, which is why we focus on the simpler version reported in Equa-
tion (4). The coefficient of the additional binary variable is generally negative, 
although not always statistically significant in the various samples analyzed.
Besides investigating intraday return volatility patterns, we also examine what 
happens to trading volume during the time intervals in question. As shown in 
Figure 2, trading volume follows the same U-shaped pattern as return volatil-
ity. We therefore expect volume changes to track changes in return volatility 
and use the same regression approach to investigate the same predictions. The 
dependent variable in the regression is the median of the sample distribution of 
volume traded during a particular time interval of the day across all days in the 
sample. For convenience, the following table summarizes the hypotheses con-
cerning changes in intraday return volatility and trading volume.
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Figure 2: Intraday Trading Volume
The graph plots the average number of shares traded in the eight stocks with the largest individual 



































































































































Ten minutes from U.S. 
macro announcement 
γ3 > 0 γ3 = 0 γ3 > 0 γ3 = 0
From U.S. macro 
announcement to SWX close 
γ4 > 0 γ4 = 0 γ4 > 0 γ4 = 0
Ten minutes 
before Wall Street open 
γ5 > 0 γ5 > 0 γ5 > 0 γ5 > 0
Time of joint Wall Street 
and SWX trading 
γ6 > 0 γ6 > 0 γ6 > 0 γ6 > 0
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2. The Data
To examine the relation between Wall Street and the Swiss Stock Exchange 
(SWX), we gather intraday stock returns and trading volume. The data cover 
two adjacent periods: an initial period that spans the dates January 6 – Septem-
ber 30, 1997, and a later period that covers the dates October 2 – June 26, 1998. 
We use the latter period to confirm the regularities observed during the former. 
We therefore refer to the former period as the original period and to the latter 
as the holdout period.
2.1 The Stock Indices
The SWX was established in 1995 and represents the first fully automated trad-
ing, clearing, and settlement system of the world. Thanks to this automation, 
trades on the SWX are carried out very quickly. During the period under analy-
sis, the completion of a trade took an average 0.5 seconds, compared to 5 seconds 
on most other exchanges. According to SWX Factbook of 1998, the SWX was the 
sixth largest exchange in the world based on its annual trading volume of 0.7 tril-
lion USD. At the end of 1998, 283 domestic and 203 foreign stocks (correspond-
ing to 231 and 193 companies, respectively) were listed on the SWX. At the time 
of analysis, the SWX opened at 10 a.m. and closed at 4:30 p.m. (Swiss time).9
We analyze the Swiss stock market with two alternative indices, the Swiss Per-
formance Index (SPI) and the Swiss Market Index (SMI). The SPI is a dividend-
corrected index that covers all domestic firms, except investment firms, listed 
on the SWX.10 The SPI is computed every 3 minutes, starting with a lag of 20 
minutes after the opening at 10:00 a.m. The delay is to prevent bias because of 
thinly traded stocks. In contrast, the SMI is an index that covers around 25 Swiss 
blue chips and represents 80% of the total market capitalization of Swiss com-
panies. The analysis of the SMI enables us to focus on the most liquid stocks on 
the SWX. The SMI is a real-time index, in that it is computed every time the 
price of one of its component stocks changes. Since it includes only fairly liquid 
stocks, it is computed from the opening of the SWX with no delay.11 Still, to get 
around the problem of infrequent trading, we ignore the first five minutes of 
trading and start computing returns from 10:05 a.m. on. The data we received 
9 Since August 3, 1998, trading hours have changed several times.
10 In addition to domestic firms, it also includes firms from Liechtenstein.
11 Starting on June 29, 1998, the first SMI price of the day is computed 2 minutes after the start 
of trading.
America and the Swiss Stock Exchange: An Intraday Analysis 
were reported in 5-minute intervals, with no time stamp for the trades reported 
within those intervals. There is therefore no guarantee that the first trade in these 
intervals occurs precisely at the beginning of the interval in question and that 
the last trade is carried out exactly five minutes to the second later. Unlike the 
SPI, the SMI does not assume dividend reinvestment.
In order to examine the correlation between Wall Street and the SWX, we 
also compute intraday returns on the S&P 500 based on data provided by the 
Futures Industry Institute in Washington, D.C. The S&P 500 is a value-weighted 
index covering 500 leading companies in the most representative industries of 
the U.S. economy. As of the end of 1998, these companies make up about 70% 
of the total market capitalization in the U.S. The index is computed four times 
every minute.
Our return dataset combines contemporaneous observations in the two mar-
kets. In compiling it, we ignore cases where such simultaneity does not occur. 
For instance, we drop the days during which one of the two markets is closed 
for holidays or Wall Street is open only in the morning. Similarly, we ignore days 
with an asynchronous switch to daylight saving time in the two countries. As a 
result, we purge the following days from the database: One day for chronologi-
cal inconsistencies, 29 days because of missing observations in either of the two 
countries (holidays, etc.), and 3 days because of other data problems. These dele-
tions yield a total sample of 308 trading days.
Table 1 reports the average intraday returns of the SMI and SPI during the 
full period ranging from January 6, 1997 to June 26, 1998. Computed over 24 
hours, these returns equal 0.182% for the SPI and 0.176% for the SMI. The table 
segments these returns roughly over three periods: the time in which the SWX 
alone is open; the time in which both the SWX and Wall Street are open; and 
the time when the SWX is closed. As one can see, very little return accumu-
lates when the SWX trades alone – 6% of the total average daily return on the 
SPI and –21% of the total average daily return on the SMI. Some return accrues 
during the time the markets are jointly open – the SPI accumulates 22% of its 
total average daily return during that time, and the SMI 14%. Yet most of the 
return is earned overnight. During the night, the SPI accrues 72% of its total 
daily return, and the SMI 106%. It looks as if investors, at least uninformed 
investors, would be better off if they stayed away from trading and simply let 
returns accumulate over night.
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2.2 Trading Volume
We define trading volume as the number of shares traded in the eight stocks with 
the largest individual trading volume on the SWX.12 According to SWX Fact-
book of 1997, the aggregate volume of these stocks represents an average 70% 
of the annual trading volume in Swiss stocks. Our proxy for trading volume is 
measured at 5-minute intervals.13 Volume is extremely high during the first five 
minutes of trading as well as during the last five minutes. We ignore these two 
time intervals. The first observations therefore refer to 10:05–10:10 a.m. and the 
last ones to 4:20–4:25 p.m. of every trading day.
12 The eight stocks in question include the bearer shares of ABB, UBS, and Zürich Versicher-
ungs-Gesellschaft; the registered shares of CS Group, Nestlé, Novartis, and Schweizerische 
Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft; and the non-voting bearer shares of Roche.
13 In principle, trades larger than CHF 200,000 can occur off the exchange but must be reported 
within 30 minutes. Our data include off-exchange trades. 
Table 1: Components of Intraday Returns on the SWX
The table reports average returns on the SPI and the SMI during different periods of the day. Spe-
cifically, for the SPI, these periods are defined as follows:
SWX open; Wall Street closed: 10:20 a.m. – 3:50 p.m. Swiss time
SWX and Wall Street both open: 3:50 p.m. – last quote (sometimes up to 1 hour after SWX close)
SWX closed: Yesterday’s last quote – 10:20 a.m. Swiss time
In contrast, for the SMI, we have the following time intervals:
SWX open; Wall Street closed: 10:05 a.m. – 3:50 p.m. Swiss time
SWX and Wall Street both open: 3:50 p.m. – last quote (sometimes up to 1 hour after SWX close)
SWX closed: Yesterday’s last quote – 10:05 a.m. Swiss time
The sample period is: 1.6.1997–6.26.1998.
Index SWX open; Wall 
Street closed
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2.3 U.S. Macroeconomic News
The U.S. macroeconomic news examined here is released at 8.30 a.m. Eastern 
Standard Time by various agencies of the federal administration in the U.S. 
such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the Census. The release 
dates are always the same and are therefore widely anticipated. For instance, the 
Employment Report is released the first Friday of every month at 8.30 a.m. East-
ern Standard Time. YAHOO Finance rates all macroeconomic releases by impor-
tance for the U.S. stock market from A to F.14 Table 2 reports the announcement 
types in the sample, along with the identity of the reporting agency and the 
reporting time. This paper focuses on announcements with a rating of at least 
B–.15 About one third of the trading days during the sample period have such 
announcements; we refer to them as days with major macroeconomic announce-
ments. The remaining days are referred to as days without major macroeconomic 
announcements. By definition, there are macroeconomic announcements on 
some of these latter days as well (at 8.30 a.m. or later), but they should be rela-
tively unimportant.
Table 2: Macroeconomic Announcements
The table lists the macroeconomic announcements of relevance for our investigation, the time of 
their release, the ranking of their importance according to YAHOO Finance, and the reporting 





Topic of Report YAHOO 
Finance Rating
Reporting Agency
8:30 a.m. Employment A Bureau of Labor Statistics
8:30 a.m. Retail Sales A– U.S. Census Bureau
8:30 a.m. Consumer Price Index B+ Bureau of Labor Statistics
8:30 a.m. International Trade B+ U.S. Census Bureau 
8:30 a.m. Durable Goods Orders B U.S. Census Bureau
8:30 a.m. Gross Domestic Product B Bureau of Economic Analysis
8:30 a.m. Housing Starts B– U.S. Census Bureau
8:30 a.m. Producer Price Index B– Bureau of Labor Statistics
14 URL: biz.yahoo.com/c/terms/terms.html.
15 In the meantime, International Trade seems to have been downgraded to C+. 
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As mentioned above, all these announcements are made at 8:30 a.m. Eastern 
Standard Time (EST), one hour before the main U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ) open.16 The release time corresponds to 2:30 p.m. Swiss 
time. B, F, and F (1995) focus on the same announce-
ments, with the exception that they ignore those relating to gross domestic 
product.17 Their study yields a ranking of importance that differs from the one 
reported here. In particular, they find that releases concerning employment and 
retail sales have no significant impact on the S&P 500 futures returns; in con-
trast, YAHOO Finance assigns those two announcements the highest ranking. 
Since the ranking of major macroeconomic announcements by type is immate-
rial for our purposes, this inconsistency is of no concern.
3. Empirical Results
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis. As mentioned above, 
we start with the so-called original sample (January 6 – September 30, 1997) 
and then replicate the investigation with the holdout sample (October 2 – June 
26, 1998).
3.1 Original Sample
3.1.1 Intraday Correlation between Wall Street and the Swiss Stock Exchange
Table 3 looks at the correlation between the two markets during the time of joint 
trading. We show the results of regressing the SMI return during a particular 5-
minute interval against the contemporaneous return and the lagged return on 
the S&P 500 [Equation (2) above]. The various rows in the table show the results 
of this regression for each of the twelve 5-minute intervals during the time both 
Wall Street and the SWX are trading. The t-statistics associated with the regres-
sion coefficients are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation according to Newey and West.
The evidence is consistent in principle with the view that the two markets are 
closely related. Nevertheless, this contention has to be properly qualified. First, 
the coefficient of the contemporaneous S&P 500 return is indeed highly signifi-
cant and generally larger than 0.8. Second, however, this relation is fairly noisy, 
16 There are news releases also at 10 a.m. EST, but they are relatively much less frequent.
17 They include the releases of Leading Indicators and of Non-farm Payrolls instead. 
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since the adjusted R2 of the regression is mostly below 50%. That means that 50% 
of the volatility of the Swiss market is due to impulses other than those reflected 
in the S&P 500 index. Third, right after the Wall Street open, SWX traders seem 
to be somewhat confused. The explanatory power of the regression during the 
first 5 minutes of contemporaneous trading is weaker than during the rest of the 
day (except for the last minutes of the day). To be honest, this could also occur 
because of infrequent trading at the start of Wall Street.18 And fourth, the lagged 
return on the S&P 500 is often negative although generally not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. The exception is during the first 15 minutes of joint trading and 
from 4:05 to 4:10 p.m. Swiss time. A lagged relation could also be the result of 
infrequent trading. The problem with this interpretation is that it does not imply 
a negative relation, nor can it explain why the SWX lags Wall Street.
A significant lagged coefficient confirms in principle the claim that the SWX 
takes its clues from Wall Street. However, unlike what we hypothesized, the rela-
tion is not positive but negative, meaning that the SWX has to correct its previ-
ous contemporaneous reaction. Consequently, it looks as if the SWX overreacts 
to Wall Street. Yet the value of the coefficients indicates that the overreaction 
is moderate. Specifically, from 3:35 to 3:40, the contemporaneous coefficient is 
0.586, more than twice the absolute value of the lagged coefficient (–0.179). From 
3:40 to 3:45, the contemporaneous coefficient grows to 0.669 and is almost six 
times larger in absolute value than the lagged coefficient of –0.115. It would be 
difficult to design a trading strategy that takes advantage of this regularity. One 
could, for example, short the SMI five minutes after the S&P 500 has increased. 
The problem with this strategy is that, given the economically rather tenuous 
lagged relation, it is both risky (the adjustment could easily be swamped by 
the contemporaneous relation with the S&P 500) and costly (transaction costs 
could easily exceed the expected gross benefits). Still, the finding of a signifi-
cantly negative lagged relation, weak as it may be, does support the contention 
that the SWX is driven in part by what happens on Wall Street. We replicated 
the analysis by adding the 5-minute return on the S&P 500 lagged 10 minutes. 
The results do not change.19
18 According to S and W (1990), even S&P 500 stocks take an average 5 to 7 min-
utes to start trading.
19 We also repeated the analysis by replacing the SMI with the SPI, an index that includes firms 
that are much less frequently traded. As pointed out above, we measure SPI returns every 3 
as opposed to every 5 minutes. The lagged relation between the SPI and the S&P 500 is still 
there, but it is weaker than what we observe for the SMI. It could be that the average firm in 
the SPI is less sensitive to what happens on Wall Street.
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Table 3: Intraday Relations between Returns on the SMI and the S&P 500
The table reports the results of estimating the following regressions of intraday SMI returns against 
contemporaneous and lagged S&P 500 returns:
 & &0 1 2 1 ,
SMI S P S P
ij ij ij ijR R R −= β + β + β +ε  i = 1,…,308; j = 1,…,12,
where subscript i refers to a given day during the sample period and subscript j denotes a given 5-
minute interval. The regression is estimated for each 5-minute interval of joint trading between 3:30 
p.m. and 4:30 p.m. across all days in the sample period. The variables are defined as follows:
SMI
ijR  = the continuously compounded return on the SMI for the 5-minute interval j on day i;
&S P




ijR −  = the continuously compounded return on the S&P 500 for the 5-minute interval j − 1 on 
day i; and,
εij = a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed error term with zero mean and constant 
volatility.
The table reports estimated regression coefficients and (in parentheses) the associated t-statistics 
(on the basis of standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to 
Newey and West).
Time interval β0 β1 β2 Adjusted R
2







































































America and the Swiss Stock Exchange: An Intraday Analysis 

























































































































 L / M
3.1.2 Return Volatility Changes
The results of estimating the regression Equation (4) for the SPI are reported in 
Table 4. We distinguish between days with and days without major macroeco-
nomic announcements. The OLS regression residuals display first-order autocor-
relation, which is why the numbers shown in parentheses are once again t-statis-
tics based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
according to Newey and West.
Let us consider days with major macroeconomic news releases first. The asso-
ciated findings are displayed in column (1) of the table. Throughout the paper, 
unless otherwise stated, highly significant denotes confidence better than 0.99 
in a one-sided test against zero. The regression has fairly large explanatory power 
– the adjusted R2 is 79%. Moreover, the coefficients of time are statistically highly 
significant. Simple calculations reveal that they imply a U-shaped volatility pat-
tern during the particular time of the day covered by the regression. Both observa-
tions apply to all subsequent regressions, which is why we will not repeat them.
The binary variable that defines the release of major macroeconomic news ( SPImacroD ) 
has a positive and significant coefficient, consistent with the hypothesis that this 
information is relevant to companies traded on the SWX. The news in question 
has more than a temporary effect, since the coefficient of the variable ( SPItotD ) is also 
positive and highly significant. Apparently, macro economic news releases induce 
an immediate rise in SWX volatility that lasts in part until the end of trading at 
4:30 p.m. Specifically, note that with values of 0.059 × 10–2 and 0.026 × 10–2, 
respectively, the coefficients associated with the variables SPImacroD and 
SPI
totD imply a 
230%-spike ( = (0.059 × 10–2 + 0.026 × 10–2) / (0.037 × 10–2) × 100) in volatility 
during the 9-minute interval of 2:29–2:38 immediately preceding and following 
the releases.20 As indicated by the 0.026 × 10–2-coefficient associated with SPItotD , 
a sizable fraction of that increase lasts until the end of the trading day. In par-
ticular, and keeping in mind that return volatility would otherwise grow along 
its U-shaped pattern, the news disclosure causes a protracted increase in return 
volatility equal to 70% ( = 0.026 × 10–2) / (0.037 × 10–2) × 100) of what the vol-
atility would otherwise be at 2:30 p.m. This volatility hike then declines during 
the day in relative terms; by the time the exchange closes at 4:30 p.m., the effect 
20 Without a news release, the return volatility at 2:30 p.m. would be 0.037 × 10–2. To see that, use the 
intercept estimate and the time coefficients in column (1), and note that 2:30 p.m. falls in the time 
interval 2:29–2:32 p.m. and therefore in the time interval t = 4 + 3/20 = 4.15. Together, that implies 
a volatility of 0.064 × 10–2 − 0.016 × 10–2 × 4.15 + 0.228 × 10–4 × 4.152 = 0.037 × 10–2.
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Table 4: Intraday SPI-volatility Patterns: Regression Estimates (Original Sample)
The table reports the results of a regression analysis of the determinants of intraday stock return 
volatility. The regression is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). Columns (1) and (2) 
report regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 



































































 t = number of 3-minute intervals expressed as a fraction of an hour. This time index 
starts with a value of 0 at 10:20–10:23 a.m., when we record the first intraday SPI 
return. The last 3-minute interval refers to the time between 4:26 p.m. and 4:29 p.m. 
Consequently, t ∈ (0, 1/20, 2/20, ..., 6 2/20);
SPI
macroD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 9-minute interval of 2:29 p.m.–2:38 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise;
SPI
totD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 120-minute interval of 2:29 p.m.–4:29 p.m., 
and equal to 0 otherwise;
SPI
WSopenD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 9-minute interval of 3:20 p.m.–3:29 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise; and,
SPI
overlapD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 60-minute interval of 3:29 p.m.–4:29 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise.
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adds 51% ( = 0.026 × 10–2) / (0.051 × 10–2) × 100) to what the volatility would 
otherwise be.21
The results also show that the opening of Wall Street is preceded by a sig-
nificant volatility decline. The coefficient of the variable SPIWSopenD  is negative and 
highly significant. That is contrary to our predictions. We will investigate this 
phenomenon further when examining what happens to trading volume.
The coefficient of the last binary variable in the table, ,SPIoverlapD  is also incon-
sistent with our predictions: Joint trading with Wall Street does not raise SWX 
return volatility. The coefficient of SPIoverlapD  is positive but clearly insignificant at 
customary levels of confidence.
Column (2) of the table replicates the regression for days without major U.S. 
macroeconomic announcements. Compared to the first column, there are four 
main observations to make. First, the coefficient of SPImacroD  maintains a positive 
and significant coefficient. This could mean that the market reacts also to macro-
economic announcements ignored in our classification because of their YAHOO 
Finance rating lower than B–. Still, the coefficient reported in column (1) for 
days with major news releases, namely 0.059 × 10–2, is more than six times larger 
than the one we find here (0.912 × 10–4). The difference, as reported in column 
(3) of the table, is statistically highly significant. Hence, higher rated disclosures 
have a substantially larger impact than other disclosures.
The second thing to note is that, whatever announcements the market reacts 
to during the days without major macroeconomic releases, their effect is tempo-
rary since it does not affect SWX volatility during the rest of the day – the coef-
ficient of SPItotD  is insignificantly different from zero at customary levels of con-
fidence. The third observation is that the anticipation of the Wall Street open 
lowers return volatility also on days without major U.S. macroeconomic releases, 
since the coefficient of SPIWSopenD  is still negative and significant. In fact, the coef-
ficient is numerically almost identical across the two samples. The anticipation 
of the Wall Street open therefore reduces return volatility by the same amount 
regardless whether it is preceded by major news releases. Fourth, and finally, the 
results confirm what we saw in column (1), namely that joint trading in the U.S. 
and Switzerland does not affect SWX return volatility.
21 Without a news release, the return volatility at 4:30 p.m. would be 0.051 × 10–2. To see that, use 
again the intercept estimate and the time coefficients in column (1), and note that the last interval 
for the SPI data is that of 4:26–4:29 p.m., which corresponds to a value t = 6 + 2/20 = 6.1. That 
implies a volatility of 0.064 × 10–2 − 0.016 × 10–2 × 6.1 + 0.228 × 10–4 × 6.12 = 0.051 × 10–2. 
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The variables ImacroD  and 
I
totD  are chosen to distinguish between the short- and 
the long-term volatility impact of macroeconomic disclosures. Since the two vari-
ables overlap, however, there could be a multicollinearity problem. We investigated 
this potential problem by computing a variance-inflation factor for each argument 
in the regression. As it turns out, there is no serious multicollinearity problem (not 
shown). That applies, in particular, to the two binary variables in question, for 
which the factor is below 7 (values between 10 and 100 would indicate moderate 
multicollinearity). The same conclusion holds for all our subsequent tables.
Table 5 replicates the analysis for the SMI. The purpose of this analysis is to 
examine whether the same results obtain if we focus on the subset of the more 
liquid stocks on the SWX. A look at the table shows that the results are quali-
tatively identical to those we observe for the SPI. The difference is that almost 
all coefficients are numerically (although not statistically) slightly larger. As in 
the case of the SPI, the release of major macroeconomic news provides both an 
immediate and a prolonged boost to return volatility. Moreover, the anticipa-
tion of the Wall Street open is preceded by a reduction in volatility, regardless 
whether we look at the sub-sample with major U.S. macroeconomic announce-
ments or without. Finally, joint trading with Wall Street does not raise the vola-
tility on the SWX.
It is well documented that volatility behavior is asymmetric, i.e., that it increases 
more strongly in reaction to the disclosure of bad news compared to what it does 
in reaction to good news (see D  and M (2004) and the litera-
ture cited therein). We do not have consensus information to distinguish good 
and bad news directly, but we can sort the announcements by whether they pro-
voke a positive or a negative change in the stock index of interest, and replicate 
the analysis by distinguishing the two situations. When we do so for the SMI in 
Table 5, we obtain results that confirm the extant evidence – bad news impacts 
volatility three times more than good news does (not shown). We obtain the same 
result when investigating the holdout sample. Overall, the results suggest that the 
release of macroeconomic news in the U.S. raises uncertainty on the SWX (par-
ticularly if it is bad). During the first minutes immediately after that disclosure, 
return volatility of the SPI goes up 230%; thereafter, it declines, but it stays at 
a level 50%–70% higher than normal. The SMI goes through similar changes. 
The results also indicate that investors on the SWX appear to slow down their 
trading right before the Wall Street open. Once that happens, return volatility 
goes back to normal. These two effects are the same regardless whether they are 
preceded by U.S. macroeconomic news disclosure.
We also examine a slightly different specification of our regression equation 
where we add a binary variable that identifies the first minutes after the Wall Street 
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Table 5: Intraday SMI-volatility Patterns: Regression Estimates (Original Sample)
The table reports the results of a regression analysis of the determinants of intraday stock return 
volatility. The regression is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). Columns (1) and (2) 
report regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 



































































t = number of 5-minute intervals expressed as a fraction of an hour.  is time index starts 
with a value of 0 at 10:05–10:10 a.m., when we record the fi rst intraday SMI return. 
 e last 5-minute interval refers to the time between 4:25 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. Conse-
quently, t ∈ (0, 1/12, 2/12, ..., 6 4/12); 
SMI
macroD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10-minute interval of 2:30 p.m.–2:40 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise;
SMI
totD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 120-minute interval of 2:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m., 
and equal to 0 otherwise;
SMI
WSopenD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10-minute interval of 3:20 p.m.–3:30 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise; and,
SMI
overlapD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 60-minute interval of 3:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise.
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open (not shown). The variable equals 1 during the 12-minute interval of 3:29 
p.m. – 3:41 p.m., and equals 0 otherwise. We find no evidence of a spike in vola-
tility at that time (the remaining results are essentially unchanged). This finding is 
inconsistent with the theoretical argument and the evidence reported in K and 
W (1990). It could be that the Wall Street open conveys less informa-
tion in the years covered here (1997–1998) than it did at the time K and W-
 performed their investigation, namely the period July 1987 to February 
1988. Market participants can use various computerized order matching systems 
(so-called electronic communications networks, ECN) to trade before and after 
the trading hours of the major U.S. stock exchanges and NASDAQ, something 
that was not possible in 1987. Consequently, the formal opening of Wall Street 
might not reveal much that SWX traders do not already know. The problem with 
this interpretation is that, if indeed only little information is disclosed when Wall 
Street opens, it is not clear why return volatility dips right before that event.
In the following section, we investigate trading volume to see whether we can 
confirm our observations. In particular, we are interested in the changes in trad-
ing volume following major macroeconomic news releases and right before the 
Wall Street open.
3.1.3 Trading Volume Changes
Table 6 shows the results of estimating the regression Equation (4) with trading 
volume as the dependent variable. Since the residuals of the regression are gener-
ally autocorrelated, we once again correct the standard errors for heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation according to Newey and West. Overall, the findings 
are very similar to those reported for return volatility. The only exception is that 
trading volume seems to decline during the time of joint trading. But let us dis-
cuss these findings in more detail.
Consider the case of days with major U.S. macroeconomic news first [column 
(1) of the table]. Based on the coefficients associated with Dmacro and Dtot , the dis-
closure of that information boosts the number of shares traded by about 34,766 
( = 24,751 + 10,015) units compared to the 13,072.30 one would in principle 
observe at 2:30 p.m.;22 this is a substantial 266% ( = 34,766 / 13,072) jump. 
Moreover, following that announcement, trading volume remains unusually 
high, namely by about 10,015 units according to the coefficient of Dtot . Since 
22 To obtain the latter figure, we use intercept estimate as well as time coefficient estimates. 
Keeping in mind that 2:30 p.m. corresponds to a value t = 4 + 5/12 = 4.417 for volume fig-
ures, we compute 38,891.61 − 17,748.24 × 4.417 + 2,694.77 × 4.4172 = 13,072.30.
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Table 6: Intraday Trading Volume Patterns: Regression Estimates (Original Sample)
The table reports the results of a regression analysis of the determinants of intraday trading volume, 
defined as number of shares traded in eight blue chips on the SWX. The regression is estimated 
with ordinary least squares (OLS). Columns (1) and (2) report regression coefficients. Numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation according to Newey and West. Estimation period: 1.6.1997–9.30.1997.
Independent 
variables




















































t = number of 5-minute intervals expressed as a fraction of an hour. This time index starts 
with a value of 0 at 10:05–10:10 a.m., when we record the first trading volume figure. 
The last 5-minute interval refers to the time between 4:20 p.m. and 4:25 p.m. Conse-
quently, t ∈ (0, 1/12, 2/12, ..., 6 3/12);
Dmacro = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10-minute interval of 2:30 p.m.–2:40 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise;
Dtot = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 115-minute interval of 2:30 p.m.–4:25 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise;
DWSopen = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10-minute interval of 3:20 p.m.–3:30 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise; and,
Doverlap = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 55-minute interval of 3:30 p.m.–4:25 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise.
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trading volume would normally follow a U-shaped pattern during the day, this 
increase changes in relative terms as the day goes by. Specifically, right after the 
announcement, the rise is 77% ( = 10.014.97 / 13,072.30) whereas by the end of 
the day it is 28% ( = 10,014.97 / 35,966.09).23 Both figures seem to be economi-
cally significant.
Consistent with what happens to return volatility, trading volume plunges later 
in the day in anticipation of the Wall Street open – the decline equals 12,241 
shares or 41% ( = 12,241.32 / 30,002.92).24 This seems to indicate that traders 
do not reshuffle their positions in anticipation of the upcoming open, since that 
would increase return volatility and trading volume. Traders simply seem to wait 
and see. But once Wall Street has opened, trading volume does not appear to go 
back up to normal levels. As indicated by the negative and significant coefficient 
of Doverlap
 
, trading overlap is associated with lower trading volume.
The analysis of the days without major macroeconomic news in column (2) 
of the table generally confirms the conclusions reached in the analysis of return 
volatility, namely that:
a. There is only a small volume hike, at 2:30 p.m., the time when major U.S. 
macro economic news is usually released. The coefficient of the variable Dmacro 
is not significantly different from zero with confidence 0.95 and is seven times 
smaller than that observed in column (1);
b. Trading volume remains unchanged from 2:30 until the end of the trading 
day (the coefficient of Dtot is insignificantly different from zero);
c. Trading volume falls right before the Wall Street open. The coefficient of 
DWSopen is negative and significant. It is, however, half the size of the coefficient 
observed in column (1). The anticipation of the Wall Street open therefore has 
a more pronounced effect on trading volume when it follows a macroeconomic 
disclosure at 2:30. This is in contrast with what we observe in Tables 4 and 5, 
where return volatility falls by the same amount regardless whether the open 
is preceded by a major macroeconomic news release; and,
d. There is no increase in volume on the SWX during the time both Wall Street 
and the SWX are open.
23 To obtain the theoretical number of shares traded at the end of the day in the absence of an announce-
ment, we have to keep in mind that 4:30 p.m. corresponds to t = 6 + 5/12 = 6.417. This yields 
a trading volume value of 38,891.61 − 17,748.24 × 6.417 + 2,694.77 × 6.4172 = 35,966.09.
24 To obtain the theoretical number of shares traded otherwise, we have to keep in mind 
that 3:20 p.m. corresponds to t = 5 + 3/12 = 5.250. This yields a trading volume value of 
38,891.61 − 17,748.24 × 5.250 + 2,694.77 × 5.2502 + 10,014.97 = 30,002.92.
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3.1 Holdout Sample
3.1.1 Intraday Correlation between Wall Street and the Swiss Stock Exchange
The regularities observed in the original sample can be confirmed in the holdout 
sample (Panel B of Table 3). There is a strong contemporaneous relation between 
the SMI and the S&P 500, except during the first 15 minutes of common trad-
ing (especially the first five). However, the adjusted R2 of the regression is again 
mostly below 50%. More importantly, we still find traces of an overreaction of 
the SMI to the S&P 500. The lagged relation between the SMI and the S&P 500 
is always negative from the opening of Wall Street at 3:30 p.m. until the closing 
of the SWX at 4:30 p.m., particularly during the first 15 minutes of joint trading 
when the coefficient in question has t-values of –5.5 and –3.8, respectively. As 
in the case of the original sample, the lagged coefficient is substantially weaker 
than the contemporaneous coefficient and could hardly justify a trading strat-
egy. Still, this finding seems to confirm the claim that the SWX reacts to what 
happens on Wall Street.
3.1.2 Return Volatility Changes
To confirm our results concerning the intraday evolution of return volatility, we 
repeat the analysis of Tables 4 and 5 with the holdout sample. We report here 
only the findings of the investigation conducted for the SMI. The examination 
of the SPI yields qualitatively the same conclusions. The relevant numbers are 
shown in Table 7 for both days with and without major U.S. macroeconomic 
disclosures.
In general, the results confirm what we find for the original sample. To docu-
ment this, let us consider the days with major macroeconomic announcements 
first. Table 7 shows the associated figures in column (1). As in the original sample, 
the disclosure of macroeconomic news has both a sizable temporary and a pro-
longed influence on stock return volatility, as measured by the positive and highly 
significant coefficients of the variables SMImacroD  and .
SMI
totD  Note, however, that the 
temporary effect is substantially smaller than the effect observed in the original 
sample. We also observe that the opening of Wall Street is still preceded by a sig-
nificant and sizable decline in volatility, as indicated by the negative coefficient of 
the variable .SMIWSopenD  Furthermore, trading overlap still does not impact volatility 
– the coefficient of the variable SMIoverlapD  is not significantly different from zero.
Consider next the days without major macroeconomic announcements. 
According to the estimates reported in column (2) of the table, the spike in 
volatility at the time when macroeconomic announcements are usually made is 
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Table 7: Intraday SMI-volatility Patterns: Regression Estimates (Holdout Sample)
The table reports the results of a regression analysis of the determinants of intraday stock return 
volatility. The regression is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). Columns (1) and (2) 
report regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 



































































t = number of 5-minute intervals expressed as a fraction of an hour.  is time index starts 
with a value of 0 at 10:05–10:10 a.m., when we record the fi rst intraday SMI return. 
 e last 5-minute interval refers to the time between 4:25 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. Conse-
quently, t ∈ (0, 1/12, 2/12, ..., 6 4/12); 
SMI
macroD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10-minute interval of 2:30 p.m.–2:40 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise;
SMI
totD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 120-minute interval of 2:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m., 
and equal to 0 otherwise;
SMI
WSopenD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10-minute interval of 3:20 p.m.–3:30 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise; and,
SMI
overlapD  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 60-minute interval of 3:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise.
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still statistically significant. The coefficient of SMImacroD  is positive as in the origi-
nal sample in Table 3 (0.014 × 10–2here compared to 0.999 × 10–4 there). As we 
pointed out, this probably shows that other U.S. macroeconomic announce-
ments are forthcoming at 2:30 p.m., even though with lower YAHOO Finance 
rating than B–. As in the original sample, however, the coefficient of SMImacroD  
during days with major macroeconomic announcements is much larger (more 
than four times larger) than that observed during days without such announce-
ments. The numbers reported in column (3) indicate that the difference is statis-
tically highly significant. Similarly, there is no evidence of a prolonged volatility 
increase following the time of these announcements. If anything, the negative 
coefficient of SMItotD suggests a volatility decline. Moreover, the data buttress the 
evidence of a volatility dip right before Wall Street’s opening – the coefficient 
of SMIWSopenD  is negative, highly significant, and almost identical to that reported 
in column (1) of the table. Finally, there is once again no evidence of a volatility 
increase during the time both markets are open – the coefficient of SMIoverlapD  is not 
significantly different from zero.
3.1.3 Changes in Trading Volume
The volume data from the holdout period yield implications that are also equally 
in line with what we obtain for the original sample. The results are in Table 8. 
In column (1) of the table, we find that major U.S. macroeconomic announce-
ments induce a sharp increase in the number of shares traded at the time they are 
released – the coefficient of the variable Dmacro is significantly different from zero. 
Note, however, that the increase is substantially smaller than that observed in the 
original sample. Following the news release, trading volume goes back somewhat 
but stabilizes until the end of trading at a level that is substantially higher than 
what we would observe otherwise – the coefficient of Dtot is positive and signifi-
cant, although almost half the size of the coefficient of Dmacro. In addition to that, 
the data support the claim that the forthcoming opening of Wall Street induces 
investors to slow down their trading significantly – the coefficient of DWSopen is 
negative and significant. Finally, the evidence again rejects the notion that joint 
trading on Wall Street and the SWX increases trading volume on the SWX.
Column (2) of the table shows the results for the sample without major mac-
roeconomic disclosures. They are fully consistent with those reported in Table 6. 
The only exception is the increase in trading volume at 2:30 p.m., the time major 
U.S. macroeconomic disclosures are usually forthcoming. That increase is statisti-
cally significant now, whereas it is only marginally so in the original sample. The 
magnitude of the increase is, however, similar across samples. Moreover, it is less 
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Table 8: Intraday Trading Volume Patterns: Regression Estimates (Holdout Sample)
The table reports the results of a regression analysis of the determinants of intraday trading volume, 
defined as number of shares traded. The regression is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Columns (1) and (2) report regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based 
on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to Newey and 
West. Estimation period: 10.2.1997–6.26.1998.
Independent 
variables



























































t = number of 5-minute intervals expressed as a fraction of an hour. This time index starts 
with a value of 0 at 10:05–10:10 a.m., when we record the first trading volume figure. 
The last 5-minute interval refers to the time between 4:20 p.m. and 4:25 p.m. Conse-
quently, t ∈ (0, 1/12, 2/12, ..., 6 3/12);
Dmacro = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10-minute interval of 2:30 p.m.–2:40 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise;
Dtot = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 115-minute interval of 2:30 p.m.–4:25 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise;
DWSopen = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10-minute interval of 3:20 p.m.–3:30 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise; and,
Doverlap = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 55-minute interval of 3:30 p.m.–4:25 p.m., and 
equal to 0 otherwise.
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than half the size as that observed on days with major news releases. Hence, the 
possible news releases in question would seem to be comparatively less important. 
Consistent with that, the increase in trading volume is only temporary, since the 
coefficient of Dtot is essentially zero (on days with major macroeconomic disclo-
sures, trading volume remains abnormally high until the close of trading). We 
also find that trading volume declines right before Wall Street opens, but later 
remains unaffected when both the U.S. and the Swiss exchanges are open.
3.2 Robustness Test
In the preceding tests, we assumed that the uncertainty generated by macro-
economic announcements persists until the end of trading on the SWX. It is 
possible, however, that this uncertainty does not last that long. We therefore 
replicate the analysis and replace the binary variable SMItotD  with the binary vari-
able ,SMIpreopenD  which identifies the time between 2:40 p.m. and 3:20 p.m., i.e., 
the period immediately following the macroeconomic release and preceding 
the Wall Street opening. The time after the opening is still identified with the 
variable .SMIoverlapD  An implied benefit from this specification is that we can take 
another look at whether the period of joint trading affects return volatility. In 
assuming, as we did so far, that the uncertainty induced by macroeconomic news 
releases lasts until the SWX close, we may end up erroneously attributing a pos-
sible increase in return volatility (and trading volume) during the period of joint 
trading to the macroeconomic announcements.
The results are summarized in Table 9 for both return volatility and trading 
volume. For simplicity, we show only the estimates that refer to SMI return vol-
atility and trading volume. The results concerning the SPI return volatility are 
qualitatively identical to those pertaining to the SMI return volatility. To avoid 
unnecessary clutter, we report only the coefficient estimates associated with the 
binary variables in the regression.
As one can see from the table, even under the new specification, there is little 
evidence that joint trading boosts return volatility. The only instance in which 
the coefficient of SMIoverlapD is positive and significant is on days with major mac-
roeconomic news releases. During days without such releases, the coefficient is 
zero. And it is similarly zero in all the regressions involving trading volume. In 
contrast, the coefficient associated with the binary variable ,SMIpreopenD  which marks 
the period immediately following the macroeconomic release and preceding the 
Wall Street opening, is positive and significant, but only following a major mac-
roeconomic announcement. Consequently, the significant coefficient of SMItotD we 
find in the preceding tables cannot possibly be induced by joint trading. Rather, 
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Table 9: Intraday SMI Volatility and Trading Volume Patterns: Regression Estimates 
(Original and Holdout Samples)
The table reports the results of a regression analysis of the determinants of intraday stock return 
volatility and of intraday trading volume, respectively. Trading volume is defined as number of 
shares traded. The regression is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). Each column reports 
regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to Newey and West. Estimation period: 
1.6.1997–6.26.1998.
Independent variables Dependent variable
original sample holdout sample










































Adjusted R2 0.801 0.828 0.751 0.739










































Adjusted R2 0.852 0.914 0.906 0.931
Number of observations 76 76 76 76
Variable Definitions
SMI
Dmacro  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10-minute interval of 2:30 p.m.–2:40 p.m., 
and equal to 0 otherwise;
SMI
D preopen  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 40-minute interval of 2:40 p.m.–3:20 p.m., 
and equal to 0 otherwise;
SMI
DWSopen  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 10-minute interval of 3:20 p.m.–3:30 p.m., 
and equal to 0 otherwise; and,
SMI
Doverlap  = a binary variable equal to 1 during the 60-minute interval of 3:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m. (55-
minute interval, i.e., 3:30 p.m.–4:25 p.m., in the case of trading volume), and equal 
to 0 otherwise.
 L / M
it would seem to be related to the news release itself. Modeling, as we did above, 
the impact of major news releases as lasting until the end of trading would there-
fore seem to be appropriate.
As for the remaining coefficients of interest, we obtain the following results. 
The coefficient of the binary variable that defines the time of macroeconomic 
news releases, SMImacroD , is still positive and significant, and substantially larger on 
days with news release than on days without. And the coefficient of SMIWSopenD  is 
almost always zero.
Taken together, these results indicate that the specification tested previously, 
namely that macroeconomic news releases can affect return volatility until the 
end of trading, seems to be the more appropriate one. It provides the correct inter-
pretation of the impact of major macroeconomic news releases (the impact lasts 
until the end of the trading day in the case of both return volatility and trading 
volume) and it does not hide the impact of the Wall Street open.
4. Conclusions
This paper asks whether and in what sense, as argued frequently in the press 
and by financial analysts, the Swiss stock market depends on Wall Street. We 
ask whether macroeconomic news that is relevant to Wall Street also affects the 
SWX. Moreover, we investigate the correlation between the two markets from 
the time Wall Street opens to the time the SWX closes looking for evidence of a 
lagged relation. And we study how the opening of Wall Street affects the return 
volatility and the trading volume on the SWX. We use an original sample for a 
preliminary test of regularities, and a holdout sample to confirm our findings.
The results are fairly consistent across samples and variables. The relation 
between Wall Street and the SWX is indeed high, confirming a close tie between 
the two markets. Most of this relation is contemporaneous. The SWX, however, 
seems to overreact to what happens on Wall Street and to correct that reaction a 
few minutes later, especially during the first 15 minutes after Wall Street opens. 
This overreaction does not appear to be strong enough to imply profitable trad-
ing strategies. Still, its occurrence supports the contention that SWX traders wait 
to see what happens on Wall Street.
We also find that major U.S. news releases and the opening of Wall Street 
affect the Swiss stock market. The release of major macroeconomic news causes 
return volatility and trading volume to go up significantly. This increase is not 
only momentary but it persists until the end of the trading day. In contrast, there 
is no evidence of a spike in return volatility or in trading volume when Wall 
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Street opens. If anything, it seems that investors slow down their trades before 
that event – return volatility declines and trading volume falls. Still, this is con-
sistent with the claim that what happens on Wall Street affects the SWX. In the 
case of trading volume, this effect seems to be more pronounced when it is pre-
ceded by major U.S. macroeconomic news releases. Finally, there is no increase 
in return volatility or trading volume on the SWX when both markets are open, 
regardless whether there has been a major macroeconomic disclosure or not. 
The reduction in trading volume right before the Wall Street open is consistent 
with the arguments concerning trading before the scheduled release of informa-
tion advanced by C (2005). Our results show, however, that other scheduled 
information releases, namely the disclosure of macroeconomic news, is not pre-
ceded by a similar dip in trading. This differential pattern in trading volume is 
not shown in a separate table, but can be inferred from Figure 2.
The findings confirm the allegation that the Swiss stock market is tied to the 
U.S. market and that it depends in part on it. The SWX reacts to some of the 
same news that Wall Street reacts to. Moreover, traders appear to wait with some 
anticipation to see how Wall Street opens and they seem to overreact to trading 
on Wall Street. The relation between the two markets, however, is fairly noisy 
and there are other factors besides what happens in the U.S. that are equally rel-
evant in determining the intraday returns on the SWX.
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SUMMARY
We want to know whether and in what sense traders on the Swiss Stock Exchange 
(SWX) are influenced by what happens on Wall Street. According to the results, 
the SWX reacts strongly when U.S. macroeconomic news relevant to Wall Street 
is disclosed. Moreover, SWX traders seem to wait with anticipation for the Wall 
Street opening. And they appear to overreact to what happens on Wall Street, 
although this overreaction is too weak to imply a profitable trading strategy.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Mit dieser Arbeit gehen wir der Frage nach, ob sich Händler an der Schwei-
zer Börse (SWX) durch Ereignisse an der Wall Street beeinflussen lassen. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die SWX stark auf die Veröffentlichung U.S.-makroöko-
nomischer Daten reagiert, welche auch für die Wall Street von Bedeutung sind. 
Darüber hinaus scheinen Händler an der SWX den Handelsbeginn an der Wall 
Street um 15:30 MEZ gespannt zu erwarten. Ausserdem finden wir Anzeichen 
dafür, dass die Händler auf die Geschehnisse an der Wall Street überreagieren; 
diese Überreaktion ist jedoch zu schwach, um daraus eine profitable Trading-
Strategie ableiten zu können.
RÉSUMÉ
Dans ce travail nous voulons savoir si les traders travaillant à la Bourse Suisse 
(SWX) se laissent influencer par les événements de Wall Street. Les résultats met-
tent en évidence que la publication de données macroéconomiques aux Etats-
Unis, également d’une grande importance pour Wall Street, provoque effecti-
vement une réaction significative. De plus, les traders à SWX semblent attendre 
avec impatience l’ouverture de l’échange à Wall Street à 15:30 HEC. Finalement, 
nous trouvons des indications qui montrent que les traders réagissent aux événe-
ments à Wall Street de manière trop prononcée. Cependant, cette réaction est 
trop faible pour en déduire une stratégie de trading profitable.
